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ABSTRACT: We estimate the labour market and health effects of a long-term unemployment 
(LTU) subsidy targeted to middle aged disadvantaged workers. In order to do so, we exploit a 
Spanish reform introduced in July 2012 that increased the age eligibility threshold to receive the 
subsidy from 52 to 55. Using a within-cohort identification strategy, we show that men 
ineligible for the subsidy were more likely to leave the labour force. In terms of health 
outcomes, although we do not report impacts on hospitalizations when considering the whole 
sample, we do find significant results when we separate the analysis by main diagnosis and 
gender. More specifically, we show a reduction by 12.9% in hospitalizations due to injuries as 
well as a drop by 2 percentage points in the probability of a mental health diagnosis for men 
who were eligible for the LTU subsidy. Our results highlight the role of long-term 
unemployment benefits as a protecting device for the health (both physical and mental) of 
middle aged, low educated men who are in a disadvantaged position in the labour market. 
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Most of the research on the welfare effects of unemployment insurance have been focused 
on its labour market consequences (Schmieder and Von Wachter 2016), in particular, on the 
potential moral hazard effects of unemployment benefits in terms of discouraging labour 
supply. In that sense, the optimal unemployment insurance has been discussed to be that in 
which the costs, as measured by the moral hazard, equal the benefits, in terms of 
consumption smoothing (Chetty 2006). Still, there are other potential costs and benefits of 
unemployment insurance that are widely unexplored. If unemployment insurance produces 
externalities other than the direct effect on consumption, these should be taken into account 
when defining the right amount of unemployment subsidies and their access criteria. 
While there is a well-established literature that shows that unemployment has detrimental 
effects on health, especially on mental health (Browning and Heinesen 2012; Cygan‐Rehm, 
Kuehnle, and Oberfichtner 2017; Eliason and Storrie 2009; Farré, Fasani, and Mueller 2018; 
Schaller and Stevens 2015), it is far less clear how unemployment benefits might interact with 
this relationship. If unemployment benefits alleviate some of these detrimental health effects 
of unemployment, such positive externalities should be taken into account as potential 
benefits of unemployment insurance. On the contrary, if unemployment benefits prolong the 
jobless situation and consolidate the detrimental health effects of unemployment, those 
indirect costs should also be accounted for when assessing the current levels of 
unemployment benefits. 
We provide evidence on the extent to which a subsidy for the long-term unemployed may 
affect the health of the recipients. We exploit a reform that was implemented in Spain in 2012 
that created exogenous variation on the eligibility of midlife workers to access the subsidy.  
The reform increased the minimum age for gaining access to the long-term unemployment 
subsidy (LTU) from 52 to 55. The program is intended to be a last-resort subsidy for individuals 
who are in a very disadvantaged position in the labour market – those who have been 
unemployed for a lengthy period of time and have lower socioeconomic status (in terms of 
education and the type of earlier employment). We use both a within- and a between-cohort 
identification strategy to compare workers affected/unaffected by this reform to reveal the 
impacts of the long-term unemployment program on hospitalizations, mental health 
diagnoses, and self-reported mental health indicators. The labour market effects of this 
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reform have also been studied by Domenech and Vannutelli (2019). Our study differs from 
theirs in at least two ways, however. First, we implement a different identification strategy 
by exploiting the within- as well as between-cohorts differences in the eligibility criteria. 
Second, we go a step further than the labour market effects to estimate the health effects of 
LTU subsidies. 
Our results show that the reform had an effect on the probability of receiving a LTU subsidy. 
Those individuals unaffected by the hike in the eligibility age have a significantly higher 
probability of receiving the LTU subsidy. The effect is greater for men than for women. When 
we look at overall hospitalizations, we do not find a significant effect of the reform. However, 
disaggregating by disease of main diagnosis and gender, we show that injury hospitalizations 
were reduced by 12.9% for men unaffected by the reform (i.e., were eligible for the LTU 
subsidy). This result is consistent with low educated men being more likely to work in 
physically demanding jobs, such as the construction sector. Furthermore, the probability of 
being diagnosed with a mental health condition also decreased for men who were eligible for 
the subsidy. Lastly, men eligible for the subsidy show better self-reported mental health and 
a lower EURO-D depression scale. None of these effects is significant for women.  
Our paper contributes to the literature that studies the effects of unemployment insurance 
(UI) on health. This is a relatively small literature that nevertheless includes some important 
contributions. For example, Cylus et al. (2015) show for the US that the negative relationship 
between unemployment and poor health was milder in states where the generosity of 
unemployment benefits were higher. In Germany, a welfare reform which, among other 
changes, reduced the generosity of unemployment benefits, was found to be associated with 
an increase in poor self-reported health among unemployed individuals (Shahidi et al. 2020).  
Two other important papers are close to ours and carefully examine the causal effects of UI 
on health using detailed administrative data. First, in the US, Kuka (2018) exploiting the 
exogeneity of state UI laws, found that greater UI generosity leads to increased health 
insurance take-up and preventive healthcare use. The author also shows that the increased 
UI benefits induced an improvement in self-reported health, especially during the periods of 
high unemployment.  
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Second, Ahammer and Packham (2020) show that an extension of UI in Austria affected 
workers’ physical and mental health, with differences by gender. Unemployed women who 
had the opportunity to receive an unemployment benefit for an additional nine weeks were 
prescribed fewer opioids and antidepressants, and were less likely to file a disability claim. As 
shown in their paper, the reason for these effects is that women match into better jobs after 
the unemployment spell. Men, however, increased their likelihood of cardiac events and 
disability claims. For the latter finding, the authors discuss that men take on riskier behaviours 
after becoming unemployed.  
We believe that our paper contributes to the above reviewed literature in several dimensions. 
First, due to the natural endogeneity between unemployment subsidies and health, ours is 
one of the very few studies to implement a credible identification strategy to estimate the 
causal health effects of receiving unemployment benefits. We do that by exploiting a unique 
reform that exogenously left similar individuals eligible/non-eligible for a LTU benefit, with 
the only difference being the month and year into which they were born. Unlike previous 
studies, we do not estimate the intensive margin effect of unemployment insurance (i.e., 
greater generosity of benefits), but instead compare those entitled/not entitled to the 
subsidy. Additionally, we are able to provide evidence for a relatively lengthy period (up to 3 
years), and we focus on a segment of the population that belongs to an especially 
disadvantaged group: middle age workers who have been unemployed for a relatively long 
period of time, have a track record of insecure employment, and a low level of education. It 
is important to note that the reform occurred during a context of continuous employment 
destruction in Spain following the Great Recession. However, there are no major sudden 
changes in the labour market during our study period except for the reform that we study. 
From a policy perspective, this is a very important segment of the population since they have 
greater risks of suffering from poor health and thereby becoming a burden for the healthcare 
system.  
Due to such characteristics of the LTU recipients, our paper also speaks to the recent literature 
on the so-called “deaths of despair”. Case and Deaton (2017) show that there has been an 
increase in morbidity and mortality in middle-aged men in the US. They attribute this 
phenomenon to a “cumulative disadvantage” process of (mainly) labour market conditions 
together with general economic decline and other socioeconomic factors. Furthermore, they 
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argue that such disadvantages will not likely be reversed in the short term. In this paper, we 
provide evidence on the extent to which social programs (i.e., LTU subsidy) are able to 
improve the health of middle-aged disadvantaged workers who have suffered from a 
“cumulative disadvantage” in the labour market. 
Lastly, our paper is also related to the literature that studies the effect of (early) retirement 
on health. Although the LTU subsidy targets relatively younger individuals, it is often used as 
a bridge to retirement. As such, it can be thought of as an early retirement subsidy. The 
literature on the effect of retirement on health is inconclusive, with research reporting 
positive, negative, and zero effects. However, in general terms retirement has been found to 
improve mental health while also accelerating the deterioration of cognitive skills (van Ours 
2019). There is additional mixed evidence for early retirement with some papers reporting 
improvements in health and reductions in mortality (Bloemen, Hochguertel, and Zweerink 
2017; Hallberg, Johansson, and Josephson 2015) and other studies finding precisely the 
opposite, particularly among men (Kuhn et al. 2018; Fitzpatrick and Moore 2018). For 
instance, Kuhn et al. (2018) find an increase in the risk of premature death among male blue-
collar workers who transitioned to early retirement through an extension of the 
unemployment benefit scheme. Nevertheless, the LTU benefit that we study may differ from 
a normal early retirement scheme in several ways. First, LTU benefit can hardly be considered 
as “voluntary”, assuming that most individuals at that age would prefer to work rather than 
be unemployed. Second, the quantity of the LTU subsidy is much lower than retirement 
pensions.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the LTU subsidy reform. 
Section 3 describes the data sources and the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the results 
and Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the main findings and the implications. 
2- The long-term unemployed (LTU) subsidy and the reform of 2012 
In July 2012, amid increasing pressure to reduce the public deficit, the Spanish government 
passed a reform to “guarantee fiscal stability and increase the competiveness of the Spanish 
economy” (Real Decreto-ley 20/2012). One of the measures of the reform was to increase the 
eligibility age for the subsidy for long-term unemployment from 52 to 55 years old.  
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The subsidy is especially targeted to workers approaching retirement age and unable to find 
a bridge job to the minimum retirement age (65 years old). Apart from the age threshold, to 
be able to access the long-term unemployment subsidy program, individuals must have 
exhausted their unemployment insurance benefits, which have a maximum duration of two 
years (SEPE 2019). Thus, the LTU program acts as a last resort option, and the amount of 
benefits provided is relatively low, around 426€ per month1. All these characteristics and 
requirements reduce the incentives to apply for the subsidy, which is designed to reach 
individuals who have serious difficulties in finding employment due to a combination of their 
low education and skill levels as well as their age.  
In the Spanish context, losing a job after the age of 50 may equate to never being able to work 
again due to the relatively high unemployment rates of the country and the relative scarcity 
of training programs for unemployed workers. This was even truer during the Great 
Recession, when unemployment rates soared sharply above 20%. In fact, according to data 
from the Spanish Labour Force survey, in 2012 42% of  unemployed workers aged 50-64 had 
been unemployed for more than two years, as compared to 30% for the overall unemployed 
population.  
Due to the challenge of finding jobs for older workers, the subsidy is often used as a bridge to 
retirement (or, in other words, a very early retirement scheme). Using the subsample of 
individuals aged 52-65 years old from the social security registers (MCVL2), the age-adjusted 
probability of receiving a retirement pension in their next employment status is 17.2% for 
those  receiving the subsidy, compared to 7.3% for the unemployed not receiving this subsidy, 
and 8.4% for the employed (Table A1, Appendix).  
Recipients of the LTU subsidy spent more time in unemployment than employment during 
the four years prior to receiving the subsidy (Table A2, Appendix). This is the case for both 
men and women. In addition, men receiving the LTU subsidy had an average of around 4.4 
employment contracts during the period 2008-2011, as compared to 3.4 for the rest of the 
unemployed and 1.8 for the employed (i.e., they changed job more often). Women receiving 
 
1 The amount of the subsidy is set at 80% of a public income index (IPREM) used as a reference by the Spanish 
Government to determine public subsidies and benefits. In the period under study (2012-2015), this index was 
set at 532.31€ (Source: http://www.iprem.com.es/). 
2 See the Data section for an explanation of the MCVL dataset. 
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the LTU subsidy also had more contracts than the employed (3.1 vs 2.5), although less than 
the rest of the unemployed (3.8). Overall, Table A2 shows that individuals receiving the LTU 
subsidy come from very precarious labour situations.  
Furthermore, recipients of the LTU subsidy were much lower educated that those with 
employment; with 35.6% lacking even primary education as compared to 21% for the 
employed; whereas they had an education level similar to the rest of the unemployed (Table 
A3, Appendix). Such educational differences were similar for men and women. Regarding 
economic sector, men receiving the LTU subsidy were strongly concentrated in the 
Construction sector, as compared to the employed (31.6% vs 10%); and similarly to the rest 
of the unemployed (32.6%). Women receiving the LTU subsidy show a higher proportion in 
the Industry sector (25.4%) as compared to the rest of the unemployed (7.7%) and to the 
employed women (7.1%). On the contrary, the percentage of women with LTU subsidy in the 
Construction sector is much lower (2.3%) than that of the men with LTU subsidy (Table A4, 
Appendix). Summing up, the recipients of the subsidy are mostly low educated and 
concentrated in the Construction (men) and Industry (women) sector, and are generally in 
unskilled jobs. Furthermore they show a very poor performance in the labour market, with 
long periods of unemployment and insecure, temporary jobs. In that sense, they have a 
disadvantaged distribution of socioeconomic determinants that may have negatively 
influenced their health throughout their life.  
3- Data and identification strategy 
We first focus on analysing the impacts of the reform on labour market outcomes of affected 
individuals and then move to the results on both physical and mental health. We use a 
combination of survey data and administrative registers, as there is no single dataset with 
information on labour market outcomes and health. 
3.1. Labour market outcomes 
We begin by analysing the effects of the reform on labour market outcomes, looking at the 
probability of receiving the LTU subsidy using register data from the Social Security 
Administration. The database, Continuous Sample of Working Lives (MCVL), is a 
representative random sample of 4% of all individuals who have contributed to the Spanish 
Social Security system. For each individual this micro-dataset records their lifetime labour 
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market participation, including the duration of their employment, the economic sector, and 
other characteristics of each employment contract or social security benefit (including 
unemployment insurance, unemployment subsidies, and disability and retirement benefits, 
among others). It also includes information on a number of socioeconomic characteristics for 
each individual such as age, gender, education, and nationality.  
We select a sample of individuals born between 1960 and 1962 because they were aged 
between 50 and 52 at the time of the reform (2012). Thus, our sample includes 61,598 
individuals and a total of 400,960 person-year observations.  
In order to estimate the causal effect of the LTU subsidy reform on employment status we 
exploit changes in these outcomes by cohort and semester of birth, before and after the 
reform. Since the reform was introduced in July 2012, individuals turning 52 right before that 
date (born in the first semester of 1960) had access to the subsidy, whereas individuals 
turning 52 right after that date (born in the second semester of 1960) did not have access to 
the subsidy until 2015 (once they turned 55).  
Thus, we define as our treatment group individuals born in the 1st semester of 1960. The 
control group consists of individuals born in the 2nd semester of 1960. Additionally, we added 
the closest cohorts unaffected by the reform (1961 and 1962) in order to control for any 
observed and unobserved differences between individuals born in the 1st and 2nd semester. 
The literature has shown that the month of birth may affect health outcomes, either directly 
(Buckles and Hungerman 2013; Costa and Lahey 2005; Rietveld and Webbink 2016) or through 
the increase in education (Angrist and Keueger 1991). In turn, the increase in education might 
also affect health outcomes (Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2006). This seems to be the case in 
Spain (Obrero, Martín, and Castello 2019). As such, simple DiD estimates (using only 1960 
cohort) may be biased. Also, under a DiD specification, differences in trends between those 
born in the 1st semester, and those born in the 2nd semester could be a result of those born 
in the 1st semester being “slightly” older. Using the cohorts of 1961-1962 as a further control, 
we eliminate these potential confounding factors that are specific to the semester of birth 
and common to both cohort 1960 and cohort 1961-62. Therefore, our main specification is a 
triple differences-in-differences (DDD) exploiting variation by cohort, semester of birth, and 
time, similarly to specifications used in previous literature (Gruber 1991, Baum 2003, Berck 
and Vilas Boas 2017).  
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If the reform had an effect on the probability of receiving the long-term unemployment 
subsidy,  we should see differential changes in the outcomes of those born in the 1st semester 
compared to those born in the 2nd semester after the reform only for the cohort of 1960 (and 
not for the 1961-62 cohort). Alternatively we might have chosen as comparison the closer, 
older cohorts (i.e., born in 1958 and 1959), instead of the closest younger cohorts (1961 and 
1962). However, cohorts 1958 and 1959 are not an appropriate comparator because 
individuals in those cohorts could access the LTU subsidy before the reform, as they turned 
52 prior to 2012. As a consequence, those born in the 1st semester of these cohorts would 
start receiving the subsidy before those born in the 2nd semester. This could provoke health 
differences between semester of birth within the control cohorts (1958 and 1959) that could 
be attributed to receiving the subsidy at different times. Therefore, the younger cohorts (i.e., 
1961 and 1962) form a better comparator because health differences due to any differential 
access to the LTU subsidy are not expected to arise among them, simply because they could 
not access the LTU subsidy until 2016 and thereafter. 
 Therefore, our identification assumption under the DDD model is that there was no shock 
that differentially affects the outcome of individuals born in the 1st semester, as compared to 
those born in 2nd semester only in year 1960, but not to those born in years 1961-1962. Below, 
we specify in greater detail all of the econometric models that we use, which vary according 
to each dataset. The DDD impact of the reform on employment status is determined by the 
following equation: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑖  +  𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑖  +  𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡  +
 𝛽4(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑖  𝑥 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑖) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑖  𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡) +
 𝛽6(𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑖𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡) +  𝛽7(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑖  𝑥 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑖 𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡  ) +
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                 [Equation 1] 
where 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑖  equals 1 if the individual i was born in 1960 and zero if born in 1961-
1962; 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑖 equals 1 if born from January to June, zero from July to December; 
𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡  equals 1 for observations from year 2012 on; 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 are year fixed effects and 




 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑, 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦, 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑, 𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡), where 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 
equals 1 if the individual i is employed, and zero otherwise; 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 equals 1 if the individual 
is receiving the long-term unemployed subsidy and zero otherwise; 𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 equals 1 if 
the individual is unemployed receiving another subsidy or benefit, and zero otherwise; and 
out of the labour market equals 1 if the individual is neither working in a formal job nor 
receiving any unemployment subsidy or benefit. Note that these four employment status are 
mutually exclusive. Each equation is estimated separately through a Linear Probability Model 
(LPM) with standard errors clustered at province level (50 provinces). 
Our main parameter of interest is 𝛽 7, which aims to measure the DDD impact of the LTU 
reform on employment status. It reflects whether the double difference between those born 
before and after July, in cohort 1960 as compared to those born in cohort 1961-62, diverges 
after the reform (from 2012 on). That is, it captures the variation in employment status that 
is specific to those born in the 1st semester (relative to those born in the 2nd semester), in the 
cohort 1960 (as compared to cohort 1961-62), after the reform. If the reform exogenously 
affected the probability of receiving the LTU subsidy, 𝛽 7 should achieve statistical 
significance. 
3.2. Physical and mental health 
In order to explore the effects of the reform on health outcomes we use two administrative 
datasets (hospitalization records and primary care data) and one survey (SHARE).  
First, we use registered data of all hospitalizations that occurred in Spanish hospitals between 
2009 and 2014, as published by the Spanish Statistical Office (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 
– INE). Each hospitalization includes information on the date of birth, gender, province of 
residence, and main diagnoses, following the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-9-
CM). As before, we use the subsample of hospitalizations of individual born in the years 1960 
(“treated” cohort) and 1961 and 1962 (“control” cohort). In total, there are 852,577 
registered hospitalizations. We aggregated them by province3, cohort of birth, semester of 
birth, and year. In order to estimate the effects we employ a similar DDD model:  
 
3 There are 50 provinces in Spain, with a median population of 657,404 inhabitants, as of 2012. 
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𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡  =  𝛽1 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑐 +  𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑠  +
 𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡  +  𝛽4(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑐  𝑥 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑠) +
 𝛽5(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑐  𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡) +  𝛽6(𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑠𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡) +
 𝛽7(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑐  𝑥 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑠 𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡  ) + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝 + 𝜇𝑝,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡           
                                                                                                                               [Equation 2] 
Independent variables are similar to those of Equation 1. We collapse the data by province, 
cohort, semester of birth, and year and create a dependent variable, 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 
which measures the number of hospitalizations per 1,000 individuals of each cohort (c) and 
semester of birth (s) for each province (p) and year (t), during the period 2009-2014. We use 
linear models weighting by province population, with standard errors clustered at the 
province level.  
Hospitalizations were grouped by main diagnoses using the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD-9), choosing the categories for which we could expect an effect of the LTU 
subsidy following previous literature (Mental health and Injuries)4, as well as the most 
prevalent ones: Digestive, Musculoskeletal, Circulatory, and cancer, which was used as a 
placebo  (Table 2).  
Again, 𝛽7 is our parameter of interest, which seeks to measure the effect of the reform on 
hospitalizations. In particular, it measures how hospitalizations evolved after the reform 
among those who were eligible for the LTU subsidy (born in the 1st semester of 1960), as 
compared to those who were not; using as control groups both those born in the 2nd semester 
of 1960 and those from the 1961-62 cohort. In this case, 𝛽7 represents the so-called “intention 
to treat” and not the actual “treatment effect” of receiving the LTU subsidy, since we do not 
have data on the employment status of hospitalized individuals. 
Next, we focus on the effect of the LTU subsidy on mental health outcomes by looking at an 
indicator that is less extreme than hospitalizations. For that, we use data from mental health 
diagnoses at primary care centres. Data come from a representative sample of registered 
 
4 Injuries are an indicator of occupational health that can be indirectly affected by the subsidy. LTU subsidy 
recipients, as explained in Section 2, come from sectors with more physically demanding jobs and are workers 
with very low educational levels. Therefore, in the absence of the subsidy, these individuals may be forced to 
accept riskier, unskilled, and manual jobs, since they are left with no alternative source of income. Such jobs are 
expected to increase the risk of suffering injuries due to work-related accidents (van Ours 2019). 
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primary care clinical data from the Spanish Minister of Health (Base de datos clínicos Atención 
Primaria – BDCAP). The BDCAP includes data on the health conditions diagnosed at primary 
care facilities. Health conditions were classified by the International Classification of Primary 
Care - 2nd Edition (CIAP2). As before, we use the subsample of individuals born between 1960 
and 1962 from regions who reported data prior to the reform (Aragon, Balearic Islands, 
Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, and Basque Country), representing around 37% of the 
Spanish population. Our final sample comprises 37,690 individuals followed from 2011 to 
2014, making a total of 150,760 person-year observations. 
Similarly to Equation 1, the effect of LTU subsidy on mental health diagnoses at primary care 
can be determined by: 
𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑖  +  𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑖  +  𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡  +
 𝛽4(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑖  𝑥 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑖) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑖  𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡) +
 𝛽6(𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑖𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡) +  𝛽7(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑖  𝑥 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑖 𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡  ) +
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡          
                                                                                                                                  [Equation 3] 
The dependent variable 𝑀𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡, equals 1 if the individual i had a diagnosed mental 
health condition at year t, and zero otherwise. The model is estimated by a LPM with 
individual fixed effects (𝛼𝑖). We use sampling weights as provided by the BDCAP to make the 
sample representative at regional level.  
Thirdly, we use data from the Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to 
infer whether the LTU had an impact on other self-reported dimensions of health, particularly 
mental health. SHARE is a multidisciplinary panel database with information on health and 
other socioeconomic variables of European individuals aged 50 or older, and representative 
at country level. We use the subsample for Spain of individuals presented at wave 5 (2013) 
and wave 6 (2015) born in the period 1960-1962. With these restrictions we have a sample of 
713 observations.  
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Unfortunately, SHARE data were not available for the years prior to the reform5. Therefore, 
our identification strategy here relies only on post-reform data. We estimate a DiD model, 
comparing the double difference between semester and cohort of birth, as follows: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽1 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑖  + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑖  𝑥 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑖) +
 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡  
                                                                                                                                [Equation 4] 
where 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑖  equals 1 if the individual was born in 1960, zero otherwise; 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑖 
equals 1 if born from January to June, zero otherwise; 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 are year fixed effects. 
The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖,𝑡  represents the following outcomes: 
- self-reported health status varying from 1 (excellent) to 5 (poor) 
- EURO-D depression scale varying  from 0 (not depressed) to 12 (very depressed) 
- any antidepressant weekly, a binary variable indicating if the individual takes any 
antidepressant weekly.  
In this case, our identification assumption is that there are no health differences between 
those born in the 1st and 2nd semesters that are cohort-specific other than those that could 
have been provoked by the reform. That is, in the absence of the reform, we should observe 
the same health differences between those born in the 1st and 2nd semester for cohort 1960 
as for cohorts 1961-1962. Our parameter of interest is 𝛽3. We estimate Equation 4 using 
different models, depending on the dependent variable: i) an ordered probit for self-reported 
health status; ii) a negative binomial model for EURO-D depression scale; iii) LPM for any 
antidepressant weekly. 
4- Results 
a)  Effect on labour market outcomes 
The DDD results displayed in Table 1 show that there was, indeed, an increase in the 
probability of receiving the LTU subsidy of 3.2 pp for those eligible for the LTU subsidy (born 
in 1st semester of 1960) with respect to those affected by the minimum age rise (born in 2nd 
 
5 Respondents of SHARE must be 50 years or older. The last wave before the reform was carried out in 2011 and 




semester of 1960). This increase is greater for men (3.7 pp) than for women (2.5 pp). 
Simultaneously, the probability of being out of the labour market fell by 2.4 pp for men, and 
by 2.3 pp for women eligible for the LTU subsidy. Lastly, there is a significant reduction (of 0.9 
pp) of being unemployed (and receiving another type of subsidy) for eligible men, but not for 
women.  
In Figure 1 we decompose the triple difference coefficient by including interactions of the 
cohort and semester of birth with each year dummy (Equation A1, Appendix) in an event-style 
model. The coefficients plotted represent the differences between the treated and control 
groups (defined by cohort and semester of birth) for every year before and after the reform. 
We set the year prior to the reform (2011) as the base category. If the trends in labour market 
outcomes are similar between the treated and control cohorts and the reform affected only 
treated individuals, then the plotted coefficients should be significant only from 2012 on.    
Because the law passed in July 2012 increased the minimum age to receive the subsidy from 
52 to 55, one might think that those born in the 1st semester of 1960 could have lost their 
subsidy following the reform because they no longer complied with the new minimum age 
requirement. However, what we see in Figure 1 is that the increased probability of receiving 
the LTU subsidy for the eligible semester-cohort remains relatively constant after the reform. 
This means that those born in the 1st semester of 1960 who received their LTU benefit before 
the reform did not lose it after the rise in the eligibility age, even though they no longer 
complied with the new minimum age of 55.  
We also see that receiving other unemployment benefits is a significant alternative to the LTU 
benefit, but only during the first year after the reform. After that, leaving the labour market 
is the only significant alternative employment status for those not eligible for the LTU subsidy, 
although this differs slightly by gender. On the one hand, the effect on being out of the labour 
market seems to remain constant or slightly greater for women over time.  On the other hand, 
for men this effect seems to fall slightly over time, while at the same time the probability of 
formal employment seems to diminish for those eligible for the LTU, although it does not 
reach the 5% significance level. Overall, the increase in the eligibility age of the LTU subsidy 
seems mainly to have pushed those who were not eligible out of the formal labour market. 
This is not surprising, since the unemployment rate in Spain in 2012 was growing sharply, to 
more than 20%. The reform also increased the probability of receiving other unemployment 
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benefits in the first year, and it might also have increased the probability of formal 
employment 1 to 2 years after the reform, but only for men; coinciding with the time at which  
employment in Spain started to recover. 
Using the same specification, we further test whether those eligible for the LTU saw their 
monthly income affected as compared to those who were non-eligible due to the minimum 
age rise. We define income as monthly formal income registered in the Social Security 
contributions from MCVL. This may come from either employment or any Social Security 
benefit, including the LTU benefit under study. There is no significant effect of the reform on 
the average monthly income (Figure A1, Appendix). This is explained by the fact that whereas 
the main alternative to LTU benefit (out of labour market) implies no income; the other two 
alternatives (formal employment and unemployed with other subsidy or benefit) imply an 
income that is considerably higher on average (1520€ and 635€) than the LTU benefit (426€).6  
As a consequence, the net effect of the reform on the average salary is not significantly 
different from zero. 
b) Effect on hospitalizations  
If we look at the descriptive statistics (Table 2) for the data on hospitalizations, we can see 
that before the reform, in 2011, the mean hospitalization rate from any diagnosis was 68 per 
thousand individuals. More specifically, for the case of mental health and injuries, 
hospitalization rates were 3 and 4.6 per thousand individuals, which represent around 4% and 
7% of the total number of hospitalizations, respectively. It is worth noting that the 
hospitalization rate for injuries among men is more than twice the rate for women.  
Table 3 reports the results of the triple difference model for overall hospitalizations rates. We 
can see that even though the coefficient is negative for both genders as well as for men alone, 
the effects are not significant.  In order to explore the effects for the different diagnoses 
separately, in Figure 2 we plot the DDD coefficients for the main groups of diseases and 
gender. As can be seen in the graph, the only group that has a significant negative coefficient 
is hospitalizations due to injuries. The reduction in hospitalization for injuries comes entirely 
 
6 Those “out of the labour market” were assigned a monthly salary of zero since they are not receiving any formal 
salary or any social security subsidy. Any informal income, which they might gain from an informal job, by 
definition, is not observed in our registered data. Table A5 in Appendix provides more details about the average 
monthly salary per employment status and how this variable was constructed. 
16 
 
from eligible men, who show a drop of 0.8 hospitalizations per thousand individuals after the 
reform. This effect implies a reduction of injury hospitalization rates of 12.9% for men with 
respect to 2011. 
The coefficients for the other diagnoses are not significant for either gender. Note that some 
of these types of diseases can be thought of as a placebo experiment, as both treatment and 
control groups should be sufficiently similar that they would have similar hospitalization rates. 
For example, hospitalizations due to cancer should be unaffected by the reform and should 
therefore show no significant difference between the treatment and control groups, which is 
exactly what we observe in Figure 2.  
In Figure 3 we plot the coefficients of an event-style model in which we interact the cohort 
and semester of birth treatment with the year dummies, setting the 2011 year as the baseline 
category. We show the results for men and women separately, for total hospitalizations, and 
for the two main diseases of interest: mental health and injuries. These figures represent a 
good test for the existence of parallel trends between the treated and control groups before 
the implementation of the policy. At the same time, the graphs allow us to understand the 
dynamics of the effects of interest.  
As we see in Figure 3, there is evidence of the parallel trend assumption being satisfied for 
both genders and for the three types of hospitalizations. Furthermore, for the case of injuries 
we can see that men who were eligible for the LTU subsidy experience an accelerating 
reduction in hospitalizations over the three years following the reform. This reduction is 
essentially driven by provinces where the rate of unemployment for those aged 50-55 years 
old was higher (i.e., provinces that were more influenced by the LTU subsidy reform) (Figure 
A2, Appendix). 
The same effect on injuries is not observed for women, however. This is consistent with the 
fact that the effect of the reform on the probability of receiving the subsidy is greater for men 
than for women.  
Also, men who were not eligible for the LTU subsidy seem to increase their probability of 
formal employment, whereas women do not. Furthermore, descriptively we can see that men 
receiving the LTU subsidy come in greater proportion from the construction sector than 
women do (31.6% for men versus 2.3% for women). It is well known that jobs in the 
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construction sector involve many more physically demanding activities. Finally, we have also 
seen in the descriptive evidence that a greater proportion of men receiving the LTU subsidy 
have not completed primary education (40.7%) than is the case for women (26.8%). This fact 
will most likely have an impact on the occupational safety of the jobs that they can access, 
whether formal or informal (if out of the labour market). 
We can see that the results for the mental health hospitalizations are not significant for either 
gender, although there is a significant reduction in mental health hospitalizations for men 
eligible for the LTU subsidy, but only in provinces more exposed to the reform (Figure A2, 
Appendix). However, it is important to remember that hospitalizations represent an extreme 
outcome in cases of mental health disease. Thus, it is not surprising that the reform did not 
have an impact on this extreme mental health outcome. In the next section we explore the 
effects on less extreme mental health outcomes such as diagnoses from registered primary 
care data, drug prescriptions, and self-reported mental health data from SHARE. 
c) Effect on mental health: primary care diagnoses, and prescriptions  
In Figure 4 we use registry primary care data to show the evolution in the probability of being 
diagnosed with a mental health condition for individuals born in the 1st and 2nd semester for 
the “treated” 1960 cohort (Panel A) and for the additional control cohorts born in 1961 and 
1962 (Panel B). The incidence of mental health diagnosis is around 6% during this period for 
the cohorts under analysis. If the reform in the access to the LTU subsidy affected the 
probability of having a mental health condition we should see a differential change by 
semester of birth in the probability of being diagnosed after the reform, but only for the 1960 
cohort and not for the 1961-62 cohorts.  
We can see in Panel A that for the 1960 cohort there is a drop in mental health diagnosis  for 
individuals born in the 1st semester (eligible for the LTU subsidy) compared to those born in 
the 2nd semester (not eligible for the LTU subsidy). Consistent with our hypothesis, for the 
unaffected 1961-62 cohort individuals born in both semesters follow exactly the same trend 
before and after the reform. By looking at Figure A3 in the appendix we can see that the drop 
in mental health conditions is mostly coming from men born in the 1st semester of the 
affected cohort.  
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When we estimate the triple difference model we can see in Table 4 that the coefficient is 
negative for the entire sample as well as for men, but is significant only for the case of men. 
Thus, men who were eligible for the LTU subsidy experienced a significant drop of 2 
percentage points in their probability of being diagnosed with a mental health condition at a 
primary care centre. We find no significant effect for women.  
To further explore the potential effects on mental health, we use register data on mental-
health related prescriptions7 from the database BIFAP (Base de Datos para la Investigación 
Farmacoepidemiológica en Atención Primaria). This dataset includes electronic records of all 
prescriptions issued by a sample of 5,714 primary care physicians from 9 Spanish regions. The 
prescriptions in our sample thus correspond to patients who visited a family doctor from the 
Spanish National Health Service, and are not necessarily representative of the overall Spanish 
population. Focusing on the subsample of 205,461 individuals born between 1960 and 1962 
who were followed from 2009 to 2014, we find no significant effect of the reform on the 
number of prescriptions for mental health conditions (Figure A4 and Table A6 in Appendix). 
c) Effect on other health outcomes – SHARE data 
Table 5 reports the results for the self-reported health outcomes using SHARE data. The first 
three columns correspond to an ordered probit model for self-reported health ranging from 
1, (excellent) to 5 (poor). We can see that the interaction coefficient shows a negative and 
significant coefficient (at 10%) for the case of men, indicating that men eligible for the LTU 
subsidy reporting better self-reported health status. 
Columns 4 to 6 show the results of a negative binomial model for the EURO-D depression 
scale as the dependent variable. Again, we see that for this self-reported mental health 
outcome, men eligible for the LTU subsidy report having significantly (at 10%) better mental 
health outcomes. As with the other outcomes analysed in the paper, we observe no significant 
differences for women. Finally, with respect to the consumption of antidepressant 
medication (columns 7 to 9), none of the coefficients are significant.  
 
7 We include as mental health-related prescriptions the following Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical 
Classification System groups (ATC): N02 Analgesics, N05 Psycholeptics, and N06 Psychoanaleptics. See Table A6 
in Appendix for more details about these prescriptions. 
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 It is important to highlight that the years available in the SHARE data are all included in the 
post-reform period. Thus, the assumption in this case is basically that the differences in 
mental health outcomes between individuals born in the 1st and 2nd semesters should be 
similar in the cohort of 1960 (treatment) as in the cohorts of 1961 and 1962 (controls) in the 
absence of the reform. Therefore, any differences between individuals born in the two 
semesters from the 1960 and the 1961-1962 cohorts are attributable to the reform. 
 In order to provide some support for the fulfilment of this assumption, we run placebo 
estimates using data from the waves before the reform was introduced (wave 1 in 2004 and 
wave 2 in 2007) and estimate the same model (Table A7 in the Appendix). In these placebo 
models we compare individuals aged 53 in wave 1 (used as the “fake” treatment group) and 
individuals aged 51 and 52 (used as control group). None of the placebo models result in 
significant coefficients for men. Thus, we are confident about the identification assumption 
and believe that the placebo results provide evidence that the differential effects for 
individuals born in the 1st semester for the 1960 cohort arise as a result of the reform.  
5- Discussion 
This paper studies the effects of a reform introduced in Spain in July 2012 that increased the 
age (from 52 to 55 years old) needed to obtain access to a long-term unemployment subsidy. 
We focus on the impacts on several labour market and health outcomes such as 
hospitalizations, mental health diagnoses, and self-reported health measures. In order to do 
so we use a combination of several data sources (register and survey data) and exploit a 
within- and a between-cohorts identification strategy.  
Literature on the welfare effects of unemployment benefits has been mainly restricted to the 
effects on labour supply and consumption, with only a few papers addressing the potential 
health effects of unemployment benefits. Our study is of special interest since the Spanish 
LTU subsidy is designed as a last resort program and is, therefore, aimed at a specific part of 
the population that is disadvantaged in several dimensions and with poor prospects of 
returning to the formal labour market; recipients of the subsidy have a background of 
relatively poor employment and social conditions, which puts them at risk of suffering from 
significant health conditions. 
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We first show that the reform had a significant effect on the probability of receiving the LTU 
subsidy. Those unaffected by the reform (i.e., eligible for LTU subsidy) had a higher probability 
of receiving the LTU subsidy (3.7 pp for men and 2.5 for women). We next turn to the effects 
on health outcomes and report no significant effects of the reform on the overall number of 
hospitalizations. However, disaggregating by disease and gender, we find a reduction in injury 
hospitalizations of 12.9% for men eligible for the LTU subsidy. As explained above, due to the 
characteristics of the target group, the alternative job (either formal or informal) is likely to 
be physically demanding and impart a higher risk of suffering from accidents while working.  
We find no effect for mental health hospitalizations, which is an expected result, as 
hospitalizations represent a very extreme outcome for mental health problems. However, 
when we look at a milder outcome, mental health diagnosis, we find that men who were 
eligible for the LTU subsidy have lower probabilities of being diagnosed with a mental health 
problem after the reform. Again, no significant effect is reported for women, who were less 
exposed to the reform (i.e., less likely to receive a LTU subsidy). For the case of mental-health 
prescriptions, the reform had no effect for either gender. Lastly, using survey data we find 
that men eligible for the subsidy show better self-reported health status and lower EURO-D 
scale.   
Our results differ from those of Kuka (2018) for the case of the US, as Spain has a universal 
health care system, meaning that increases in insurance take-up rates cannot explain our 
results.  Furthermore, our results differ from those in Ahammer and Packham (2020), as we 
find significant effects only for the case of men, as they are more likely than women to receive 
the LTU subsidy – a result of the higher labour market participation rates of Spanish men in 
affected cohorts.  
The paper has a limitation that is worth mentioning: our health results rely on ITT estimates 
because in the health databases we cannot identify the labour market status of individuals. 
Still, although the “treatment” probability (i.e., receiving the LTU subsidy) among affected 
men is low (3.7 pp), we expect them to be overrepresented in the pool of hospitalizations, as 
they have several socioeconomic and labour market disadvantages (low education, long-term 
unemployment, and low-occupational health jobs with higher risks for health), which are 
clearly linked to poorer health outcomes (see Tables A8 and A9 in the Appendix).  
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Finally, we believe that our results are very important from a policy perspective as they 
provide credible evidence on the net health effects of the LTU subsidy. When we perform a 
simple back-of-the-envelope calculation to account for the costs of injury hospitalizations that 
are avoided, we estimate that those entitled to the subsidy incurred 1,133 fewer injury 
hospitalizations, which in turn translate into 1,860,000 € yearly hospital expenses (See Table 
A10 for more details).  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Triple difference (DDD) model for employment status: Linear probability model (LPM). 
  Both sexes   Men  Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)   (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Subsidy Employed Unemp. Out LM  Subsidy Employed Unemp. Out LM  Subsidy Employed Unemp. Out LM 
                              
Cohort 1960 (A) 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001  -0.000 -0.005 0.003 0.002  0.001 0.006 -0.008** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Semester 1 (B) 0.000 -0.008** 0.005** 0.003  -0.000 -0.014*** 0.009*** 0.005*  0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) 
Post2012 (C) -0.000 -0.109*** -0.004 0.113***  -0.000 -0.125*** -0.002 0.128***  0.000 -0.090*** -0.006 0.096*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)  (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
A x B 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001  0.000 0.009 -0.007 -0.002  0.000 -0.011 0.009** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.001) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
A x C 0.002*** -0.006 0.000 0.004  0.002*** -0.004 -0.001 0.003  0.002*** -0.007 0.001 0.004 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
B x C 0.000 0.003 -0.006** 0.003  0.000 0.003 -0.008*** 0.005  0.000 0.004 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
DDD Coefficient (AxBxC) 0.032*** -0.005 -0.009*** -0.017***  0.037*** -0.009 -0.011* 
-
0.017***  0.025*** -0.000 -0.007 -0.017** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)  (0.002) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) 
Constant 0.001** 0.837*** 0.052*** 0.110***  0.001 0.871*** 0.054*** 0.074***  0.001*** 0.798*** 0.050*** 0.152*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
               
Observations 431,057 431,057 431,057 431,057  232,994 232,994 232,994 232,994  198,063 198,063 198,063 198,063 
R-squared 0.026 0.023 0.007 0.017  0.033 0.027 0.008 0.023  0.020 0.023 0.006 0.017 
Region FE YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES   YES YES YES YES   YES YES YES YES 
Clustered standard errors at province level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, Columns (1), (5) and (9) LPM with dependent variable equal 1 for those receiving the LTU subsidy, zero 
otherwise. Columns (2), (6), and (10) LPM with dependent variable equal 1 for those employed, zero otherwise. Columns (3), (7), and (11) LPM with dependent variable equal 1 for those unemployed 
(receiving other subsidy or benefit), zero otherwise. Columns (4), (8), and (12) LPM with dependent variable equal 1 for those out of labour market (neither working nor receiving any unemployment 




Figure 1. DDD estimates for employment status over time. 
a) LTU subsidy b) Employed 
  
c) Unemployed d) Out of labour market 
  
NOTES: These figures plot the coefficients of the interactions between the double difference cohort-semester and the year dummies, which results from the decomposition 
the DDD coefficient for employment status, as explained in Equation A1 of the appendix section. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics: Mean hospitalization rates (per 1,000 individuals) in 2011. 
 Mean (S.E.) 
 All Men Women 
    
All hospitalizations 68.79 73.60 63.78 
 (0.60) (0.76) (0.64) 
    
Mental Health (ICD-7: 290-319) 3.01 3.22 2.78 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) 
Injuries (ICD-7: 800-959) 4.64 6.30 2.92 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) 
    
Digestive (ICD-7:  520-579) 10.85 13.45 8.13 
 (0.14) (0.21) (0.16) 
Musculoskeletal (ICD-7: 710-739) 7.99 8.45 7.51 
 (0.16) (0.21) (0.17) 
Circulatory (ICD-7: 390-459) 7.13 9.51 4.66 
 (0.12) (0.18) (0.13) 
Cancer (ICD-7: 140-239) 9.14 6.66 11.71 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.19) 
    
Observations 300 300 300 
NOTES: This table reports the mean hospitalization rate (per 1,000 inhabitants) by cohort, 
and semester of birth, at province level, for the year prior to the reform (2011), for 





Table 3. Triple difference (DDD) model: Hospitalizations rates. 
  All hospitalizations 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Men Women 
    
Cohort 1960 (A) 3.19*** 4.18*** 2.19*** 
 (0.47) (0.74) (0.67) 
Semester 1 (B) -0.33 -0.20 -0.48 
 (0.45) (0.60) (0.54) 
Post2012 (C) 11.18*** 15.98*** 6.44*** 
 (0.78) (0.88) (0.97) 
A x B 3.18*** 4.27*** 2.09** 
 (0.79) (1.18) (0.89) 
A x C 0.68 1.56 -0.14 
 (0.46) (0.95) (0.69) 
B x C 0.42 0.32 0.53 
 (0.43) (0.77) (0.48) 
DDD Coefficient (A x B x C) -0.25 -1.30 0.76 
 (0.71) (1.37) (1.14) 
    
Mean Y (at 2011) 68.79 73.60 63.78 
 (0.60) (0.76) (0.64) 
    
DDD effect (% over Mean Y) -0.4% -1.8% 1.2% 
    
Observations 1,800 1,800 1,800 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Province FE YES YES YES 














Figure 2- DDD estimates per group of disease of main diagnosis (ICD-9) 
 
NOTES: Coefficients (and 95% Confidence Intervals) come from running the model of Equation 2 separately per ICD-9 diagnosis group and gender. 
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Figure 3. Impact of the LTU subsidy over time on hospitalizations rates (per 1,000 inhabitants). 
a) All hospitalizations. Men c) Mental health hospitalizations. Men e) Injuries hospitalizations. Men 
  
 
b) All hospitalizations. Women d) Mental health hospitalizations. Women f) Injuries hospitalizations. Women 
  
 
NOTES: These figures plot the coefficients of the interactions between the double difference cohort-semester and the year dummies, which results from the decomposition the DDD coefficient for 
employmen status, as explained in Equation A2 of Appendix  
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Table 4. Triple difference (DDD) model: Probability of a mental health diagnosis. 
 Any mental health diagnosis 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Men Women 
    
Cohort 1960 (A) -0.0995 -0.246 0.0847 
 (0.0874) (0.158) (0.0780) 
Semester 1 (B) -0.0235 -0.0303 -0.0898 
 (0.0400) (0.0221) (0.0848) 
Post2012 (C) 0.00894** 0.00453 0.0134** 
 (0.00354) (0.00479) (0.00521) 
A x B 0.130 0.195 0.121 
 (0.0868) (0.132) (0.106) 
A x C 0.00349 0.00991 -0.00305 
 (0.00535) (0.00722) (0.00792) 
B x C -0.00102 0.00492 -0.00706 
 (0.00456) (0.00611) (0.00678) 
DDD Coefficient (A x B x C) -0.00674 -0.0203** 0.00736 
 (0.00763) (0.0102) (0.0114) 
    
Observations 150,759 76,814 73,945 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Region FE YES YES YES 


















Table 5. Difference in difference (DiD) model. SHARE data (Waves 5 [2013] and 6 [2015]): Self-reported health outcomes. 
 
  Self-reported Health Statusa   Euro-d scaleb   Any antidepressant weeklyc 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 All Men Women  All Men Women  All Men  Women 
                       
Cohort 1960 -0.0465 0.243 -0.217  -0.424* 0.214 -0.559*  -0.00690 0.0286 -0.00970 
(Base category: Cohort 1961-62) (0.127) (0.214) (0.160)  (0.242) (0.355) (0.316)  (0.0263) (0.0198) (0.0393) 
            
Semester 1 -0.0420 0.260 -0.184  -0.241 0.508 -0.537*  0.00336 0.0263 0.00120 
 (0.111) (0.192) (0.138)  (0.223) (0.321) (0.297)  (0.0254) (0.0193) (0.0358) 
Cohort 1960 x Semester 1 -0.0254 -0.452* 0.221  0.108 -0.762* 0.547  0.00912 -0.0310 0.0202 
 (0.162) (0.267) (0.206)  (0.349) (0.404) (0.519)  (0.0361) (0.0325) (0.0542) 
            
Observations 712 272 440  681 256 425  713 273 440 
Year FE YES YES YES   YES YES YES   YES YES YES 
NOTES: D Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.a Columns (1) (2) (3) report coefficients from ordered probit with the dependent variable being self-reported-
health status (1 = excellent, 2 = very good, 3 = good, 4 = fair, 5 = poor). b Columns (4) (5) (6) report marginal effects from the negative binomial model with EURO-D depression scale as dependent 
variable. EURO-D varies from 0 (not depressed) to 12 (very depressed). cColumns (7) (8) (9) report coefficients from the LPM with a binary dependent variable indicating if the individual is taking 
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1- DDD effect over time for employment status  
Coefficients plotted in Figure 1 represent  𝛾𝑡 in the following equation, which decomposes the 
DDD coefficient into interactions between the double difference cohort-semester and the 
year dummies, setting 2011 as the reference category: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑐  + 𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑠  +  𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡  +
 𝛽4(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑐  𝑥 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑠) +  𝛽5(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑐  𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡) +
 𝛽6(𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑠𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡) +  ∑ 𝛾𝑡
2014
𝑡=2009 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑥 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1969𝑐  𝑥 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑠) +
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝   
                                                                                                                                           [Equation A1] 
 
All variables above are similar to those explained in Equation 1 of the main text. 
 
2- DDD effect over time for hospitalizations rates  
Coefficients plotted in Figure 1 represent  𝛾𝑡 in the following equation, which decomposes the 
DDD coefficient into interactions between the double difference cohort-semester and the 
year dummies, setting 2011 as the reference category: 
𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝,𝑐,𝑠,𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑐  +  𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑠  +
 𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡  +  𝛽4(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑐  𝑥 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑠) +
 𝛽5(𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1960𝑐  𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡) +
 𝛽6(𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑠𝑥 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟2012𝑡) +  ∑ 𝛾𝑡
2014
𝑡=2009 (𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑥 𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡1969𝑐  𝑥 𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟1𝑠) +
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑝   
                                                                                                                                             [Equation A2] 
 












Table A1. Age-adjusted probability of retirement per employment status. 
  










NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. Predicted probabilities from a logit model with a binary variable 
indicating if the next registry of the individual was retirement, with employment status and age as 
explanatory variables. MCVL subsample of individuals older than 52 years old for the period 2008-2011 
(before the reform). 
 
 
Table A2. Labour market record by employment status of those born in 1st semester of 1960 
  Employed Unemployed LTU subsidy 
Panel A: Men 
Months employed 2008-2011          45.3 28.1 19.8 
Months unemployed 2008-2011 1.6 13.9 22.0 
Number of contracts 2008-2011 1.8 3.4 4.4 
Number of temporary contracts 2008-2011 0.5 2.4 3.6 
Panel B: Women 
Months unemployed 2008-2011 42.8 23.0 16.5 
Month employed 2008-2011 1.6 12.7 18.4 
Number of contracts 2008-2011 2.5 3.8 3.1 
Number of temporary contracts 2008-2011 1.1 2.9 2.1 
NOTES: MCVL Subsample of individuals born in the first semester of 1960 (5,417 men and 4,143 women). The employment 









Table A3. Education level by employment status of those born in 1st semester of 1960. 
 No education Primary Secondary Tertiary n 
Panel A: Both sexes 
Employed 21.6% 16.6% 48.3% 13.5% 7783 
Unemployed 36.8% 19.3% 38.7% 5.2% 1090 
LTU subsidy 35.6% 22.7% 39.1% 2.6% 427 
Panel B: Men 
Employed 22.3% 17.9% 47.2% 12.6% 4348 
Unemployed 41.3% 19.9% 36.0% 2.9% 623 
LTU subsidy 40.7% 21.1% 35.6% 2.6% 270 
Panel C: Women 
Employed 20.7% 15.0% 49.8% 14.6% 3435 
Unemployed 30.8% 18.4% 42.4% 8.4% 467 
LTU Subsidy 26.8% 25.5% 45.2% 2.5% 157 
      
Total sample 25.5% 18.3% 45.2% 11.0% 9300 
NOTES: MCVL Subsample of individuals born in the first semester of 1960, for which we had information on education level 
(9,300 observations out of 9,590). The employment status corresponds to that recorded on 15 November 2012. 
 
 
Table A4. Economic sector (of last job) by employment status of those born in 1st semester 
of 1960. 
 Primary Industry Construction Hostelry Other Services n 
Panel A: Both sexes 
Employed 5.3% 12.4% 6.2% 7.3% 68.8% 7754 
Unemployed 2.9% 12.2% 21.2% 11.7% 51.9% 996 
LTU subsidy 3.7% 20.1% 21.7% 8.6% 46.0% 383 
Panel B: Men 
Employed 6.2% 16.5% 10.0% 7.0% 60.3% 4401 
Unemployed 3.6% 15.2% 32.6% 7.8% 40.7% 604 
LTU subsidy 4.7% 17.4% 31.6% 5.9% 40.3% 253 
Panel C: Women 
Employed 4.1% 7.1% 1.3% 7.8% 79.8% 3353 
Unemployed 1.8% 7.7% 3.6% 17.9% 69.1% 392 
LTU subsidy 1.5% 25.4% 2.3% 13.8% 56.9% 130 
       
Total sample 5.9% 16.4% 13.6% 7.0% 57.1% 9133 
NOTES: MCVL Subsample of individuals born in the first semester of 1960, for which we had information on economic sector 







Figure A1. DDD estimates for monthly income over time 
 
NOTES. Monthly income are expressed in 2012 euros. For a detailed explanation of how monthly income was calculated per 
each employment status, see Table A5. 
 
Table A5. Average monthly income per employment status. 
 
  
Employment status Mean SD Min Máx 
Employed 1520.71 882.50 0 3262.50 
Unemployed 635.76 272.49 426.00 1267.39 
LTU subsidy 426.00 0 426.00 426.00 
 
NOTES: MCVL Subsample of those born in first semester of 1960, in November 2012. Average 
monthly income for those employed is a proxy for real income based on Social Security 
contributions. These are subject to a pre-determined maximum per year. Therefore, the proxy for 
monthly income of the employed might show a lower dispersion than the real income since this 
proxy will not capture the highest salaries. Monthly income for the unemployed are estimated by 
the authors based on the historical individual Social Security contributions and applying the 
corresponding percentages from each year´s labour legislation. Furthermore, unemployment 
benefits are subject to a maximum and minimum depending on the number of children each 
recipient has. Since in our MCVL sample we do not know the number of children of each individual, 
we apply a weighted average maximum and minimum unemployment subsidy based on the 
average number of children reported in our SHARE sample for those born between 1960 and 1962. 
 
 
      
37 
 
Figure A2. Impact of LTU subsidy over time on hospitalization rates (per 1,000 inhabitants), 
high vs low 50-55 years old unemployment provinces. 
a) Injuries, Men b) Injuries, Women 
  
c) Mental health, Men d) Mental health, Women 
  
NOTES: These figures plot the coefficients of the interactions between the double difference cohort-semester and the 
year dummies, which results from the decomposition of the DDD coefficient for employment status, similarly to what is 






Figure A3. Proportion of individuals diagnosed with a mental health condition by semester 






Figure A4. DDD estimates for number of mental-health related prescriptions over time. 
 
NOTES: This figure plots the coefficients of the interactions between the double difference cohort-semester and the year 
dummies, which results from the decomposition the DDD coefficient for the number of prescriptions, as explained in 
Equation A2 of Appendix. We include as mental health-related prescriptions the following Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical 
Classification System groups (ATC): N02 Analgesics, N05 Psycholeptics, and N06 Psychoanaleptics. Same non-significant 
results appear when the analysis is done separately for each of the three categories. Table A6 contains descriptive data of 




Table A6. Descriptive statistics of mental-health related prescriptions 
        With at least one prescription 
  Mean S.E.  % from total Mean 
Analgesics (ATC=N02)  1.11 4.55  28.0% 3.96 
Psycoleptics (ATC= N05) 2.01 8.05  22.4% 8.97 
Psycoanaleptics (ATC= N06) 1.08 4.09  12.2% 8.78 
Total mental-health related 4.19 0.01   41.3% 10.16 
NOTES: Descriptive statistic from subsample of 205,461 individuals (98,667 men and 106,794 female) born between 1960 






Table A7. SHARE Placebo (Waves 1 [2004-2005] & 2 [2007]): Difference in difference (DiD) mode for self-reported health outcomes. 
 
 Self-reported Health Status
a 
 EURO-D scale
b Any antidepressant weeklyc 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  
 All Men Women  All Men Women  All Men Women  
             
Cohort 1951 0.150 0.241 0.0834  0.203 0.301 0.162  -0.00268 0.0357 -0.0233  
(Base category: Cohort 1952-53) (0.156) (0.258) (0.198)  (0.132) (0.246) (0.148)  (0.0397) (0.0522) (0.0567)  
Semester 1 0.364*** 0.334 0.397**  0.165 0.253 0.160  0.0501 0.0321 0.0728  
 (0.141) (0.225) (0.180)  (0.115) (0.215) (0.127)  (0.0362) (0.0405) (0.0551)  
Cohort 1951 x Semester 1 -0.103 0.0495 -0.200  -0.222 -0.352 -0.177  -0.0285 -0.00208 -0.0623  
 (0.238) (0.361) (0.322)  (0.179) (0.332) (0.199)  (0.0574) (0.0766) (0.0815)  
             
Observations 450 193 257  450 193 257  450 193 257  
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES  
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.a Columns (1) (2) (3) report coefficients from ordered probit with the dependent variable 
being self-reported health status (1 = excellent, 2 = very good, 3 = good, 4 = fair, 5 = poor). b Columns (4) (5) (6) report marginal effects from the negative binomial model 
with EURO-D depression scale as dependent variable. EURO-D varies from 0 (not depressed) to 12 (very depressed). cColumns (7) (8) (9) report coefficients from the LPM 










Table A8. Adjusted predicted probability of injuries by education level and economic sector. 
2011 Spanish National Health Survey. 
   Education level    Total 
VARIABLES No education Primary Secondary Tertiary   (Any education level) 
Economic sector of last job       
       
Primary 0.047 0.047 0.043 0.007  0.033 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.021) (0.006)  (0.015) 
Industry  0.066 0.065 0.060 0.010  0.047 
 (0.032) (0.016) (0.017) (0.008)  (0.012) 
Construction 0.074 0.074 0.068 0.012  0.053 
 (0.035) (0.019) (0.022) (0.009)  (0.015) 
Hostelry 0.043 0.043 0.039 0.007  0.031 
 (0.031) (0.025) (0.024) (0.006)  (0.018) 
Other services 0.047 0.047 0.043 0.007  0.033 
 (0.022) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005)  (0.007) 
       
Total (Any economic sector) 0.054 0.054 0.049 0.008  0.038 
  (0.024) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006)   0.006 
 
NOTES: Subsample of 1,461 men aged 50-59 years old from the 2011 Spanish National Survey. Each cell reports the age-
adjusted predicted probability of having suffered an injury in the previous 12 months by education level and economic sector 
of last job (Standard Errors in parentheses). Adjusted predicted probabilities were calculated by running a logit model with a 
dummy variable indicating injury probability in the previous 12 months as dependent variable and controlling by age, education 
level, and economic sector of last job. Note that the same characteristics associated with receiving the LTU subsidy are also 
associated with suffering an injury. For instance, men with low education from the construction sector (those much more likely 
to receive a LTU subsidy) have a probability of suffering injuries almost twice that of the sample average (7.4% vs 3.8%). These 
results, together with those in Table A9, suggest that the 3.7% affected by the LTU subsidy reform account for significantly 














Table A9. Adjusted predicted probability of mental health illness by education level and 
economic sector. 2011 Spanish National Health Survey 
   Education level    Total 
 No education Primary Secondary Tertiary   (Any education level) 
Economic sector of last job       
       
Primary 0.171 0.123 0.107 0.062  0.108 
 (0.053) (0.032) (0.033) (0.025)  (0.029) 
Industry  0.180 0.131 0.113 0.066  0.114 
 (0.051) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021)  (0.018) 
Construction 0.130 0.093 0.080 0.046  0.081 
 (0.040) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017)  (0.018) 
Hostelry 0.138 0.099 0.085 0.049  0.086 
 (0.058) (0.036) (0.033) (0.024)  (0.032) 
Other services 0.127 0.090 0.078 0.044  0.078 
 (0.036) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013)  (0.010) 
       
Total (Any economic sector) 0.141 0.101 0.087 0.050  0.087 
  (0.036) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)   (0.007) 
 
NOTES: Subsample of 1,461 men aged 50-59 years old from the 2011 Spanish National Survey. Each cell reports the age-
adjusted predicted probability of having suffered from a mental health illness in the previous 12 months by education level and 
economic sector of last job (Standard Errors in parentheses). Adjusted predicted probabilities were calculated by running a 
logit model with a dummy variable indicating mental health illness as dependent variable and controlling by age, education 
level, and economic sector of last job. Note that the same characteristics associated with receiving the LTU subsidy are also 
associated with suffering a mental illness. For instance, men with low education from the construction sector (those much 
more likely to receive a LTU subsidy) have a probability of 13% of suffering from a mental illness, as compared to the average 
of 8.7%. These results, together with those in Table A8, suggest that the 3.7% affected by the LTU subsidy reform account for 
significantly more than that 3.7% in terms of health outcomes.  
Table A10. Net effects of the LTU subsidy reform on men’s injuries hospitalizations. 
Year  
Cohorts non-eligible for LTU 





due to restricted access 
to LTU subsidy (12.9%) Imputed costs 
     
2012 2nd semester 1960 940 121 597,206 € 
2013 1961 and 2nd semester 1960 2,899 374 1,841,807 € 
2014 1962, 1961, and 2nd semester 1960 4,944 638 3,141,047 € 
     
Total 2012-2014 8783 1133 5,580,059 € 
Yearly average 2012-2014 2928 378 1,860,020 € 
 
NOTES: Following our estimation results, we assumed that the cohorts that were restricted regarding access to the LTU 
subsidy would have had 12.9% fewer injury hospitalizations than had they had access to the LTU subsidy. Note that each 
year after the reform, more cohorts are affected by the age increase and therefore the effects of the reform also increase 
by year. For instance, while in 2012 only those born in 2nd semester of 1960 would have been eligible for the LTU subsidy if 
the policy had not changed, in 2013 also those born in 1961 would have been eligible if the policy had not changed because 
they already turned 52. Number of hospitalizations per cohort was calculated using registered data of Spanish hospitals 
between 2012 and 2014 (See Section 3.2). We use as hospitalization costs the average cost of the hospitalizations by the 
ICD-9 group: “Injuries and poisoning (ICD-9: 800-999)” of the Spanish public hospitals from 2004 (last year available with 
costs by ICD-9 diagnosis group). Source: “Los costes de hospitalización en el Sistema Nacional de Salud. Avance datos 2005”, 





IEB Working Papers  
2016 
 
2016/1, Galletta, S.: "Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: evidence from a quasi-experiment 
in Italy" 
2016/2, Flatley, L.; Giulietti, M.; Grossi, L.; Trujillo-Baute, E.; Waterson, M.: "Analysing the potential 
economic value of energy storage" 
2016/3, Calero, J.; Murillo Huertas, I.P.; Raymond Bara, J.L.: "Education, age and skills: an analysis using the 
PIAAC survey" 
2016/4, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Daví-Arderius, D.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: "The economic impact of electricity losses" 
2016/5, Falck, O.; Heimisch, A.; Wiederhold, S.: "Returns to ICT skills" 
2016/6, Halmenschlager, C.; Mantovani, A.: "On the private and social desirability of mixed bundling in 
complementary markets with cost savings" 
2016/7, Choi, A.; Gil, M.; Mediavilla, M.; Valbuena, J.: "Double toil and trouble: grade retention and academic 
performance" 
2016/8, González-Val, R.: "Historical urban growth in Europe (1300–1800)" 
2016/9, Guio, J.; Choi, A.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "Labor markets, academic performance and the risk of school dropout: 
evidence for Spain" 
2016/10, Bianchini, S.; Pellegrino, G.; Tamagni, F.: "Innovation strategies and firm growth" 
2016/11, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Silva, J.I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: "Local labor market effects of public employment" 
2016/12, Sanchez-Vidal, M.: "Small shops for sale! The effects of big-box openings on grocery stores" 
2016/13, Costa-Campi, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.; Martínez-Ros, E.: "What are the determinants of investment 
in environmental R&D?" 
2016/14, García-López, M.A; Hémet, C.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: "Next train to the polycentric city: The effect of 
railroads on subcenter formation" 
2016/15, Matas, A.; Raymond, J.L.; Dominguez, A.: "Changes in fuel economy: An analysis of the Spanish car 
market" 
2016/16, Leme, A.; Escardíbul, J.O.: "The effect of a specialized versus a general upper secondary school 
curriculum on students’ performance and inequality. A difference-in-differences cross country comparison" 
2016/17, Scandurra, R.I.; Calero, J.: “Modelling adult skills in OECD countries” 
2016/18, Fernández-Gutiérrez, M.; Calero, J.: “Leisure and education: insights from a time-use analysis” 
2016/19, Del Rio, P.; Mir-Artigues, P.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “Analysing the impact of renewable energy regulation 
on retail electricity prices” 
2016/20, Taltavull de la Paz, P.; Juárez, F.; Monllor, P.: “Fuel Poverty: Evidence from housing perspective” 
2016/21, Ferraresi, M.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.; Zanardi, A.: “Switch towards tax centralization in Italy: A wake 
up for the local political budget cycle” 
2016/22, Ferraresi, M.; Migali, G.; Nordi, F.; Rizzo, L.: “Spatial interaction in local expenditures among Italian 
municipalities: evidence from Italy 2001-2011” 
2016/23, Daví-Arderius, D.; Sanin, M.E.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “CO2 content of electricity losses” 
2016/24, Arqué-Castells, P.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Banking the unbanked: Evidence from the Spanish banking 
expansion plan“ 
2016/25 Choi, Á.; Gil, M.; Mediavilla, M.; Valbuena, J.: “The evolution of educational inequalities in Spain: 
Dynamic evidence from repeated cross-sections” 
2016/26, Brutti, Z.: “Cities drifting apart: Heterogeneous outcomes of decentralizing public education” 
2016/27, Backus, P.; Cubel, M.; Guid, M.; Sánchez-Pages, S.; Lopez Manas, E.: “Gender, competition and 
performance: evidence from real tournaments” 
2016/28, Costa-Campi, M.T.; Duch-Brown, N.; García-Quevedo, J.: “Innovation strategies of energy firms” 
2016/29, Daniele, G.; Dipoppa, G.: “Mafia, elections and violence against politicians” 





2017/1, González Pampillón, N.; Jofre-Monseny, J.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Can urban renewal policies reverse 
neighborhood ethnic dynamics?” 
2017/2, Gómez San Román, T.: “Integration of DERs on power systems: challenges and opportunities” 
2017/3, Bianchini, S.; Pellegrino, G.: “Innovation persistence and employment dynamics” 
2017/4, Curto‐Grau, M.; Solé‐Ollé, A.; Sorribas‐Navarro, P.: “Does electoral competition curb party favoritism?” 
2017/5, Solé‐Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Housing booms and busts and local fiscal policy” 
2017/6, Esteller, A.; Piolatto, A.; Rablen, M.D.: “Taxing high-income earners: Tax avoidance and mobility” 




IEB Working Papers  
2017/8, Nepal, R.; Cram, L.; Jamasb, T.; Sen, A.: “Small systems, big targets: power sector reforms and renewable 
energy development in small electricity systems” 
2017/9, Carozzi, F.; Repetto, L.: “Distributive politics inside the city? The political economy of Spain’s plan E” 
2017/10, Neisser, C.: “The elasticity of taxable income: A meta-regression analysis” 
2017/11, Baker, E.; Bosetti, V.; Salo, A.: “Finding common ground when experts disagree: robust portfolio decision 
analysis” 
2017/12, Murillo, I.P; Raymond, J.L; Calero, J.: “Efficiency in the transformation of schooling into competences:  
A cross-country analysis using PIAAC data” 
2017/13, Ferrer-Esteban, G.; Mediavilla, M.: “The more educated, the more engaged? An analysis of social capital 
and education” 
2017/14, Sanchis-Guarner, R.: “Decomposing the impact of immigration on house prices” 
2017/15, Schwab, T.; Todtenhaupt, M.: “Spillover from the haven: Cross-border externalities of patent box regimes 
within multinational firms” 
2017/16, Chacón, M.; Jensen, J.: “The institutional determinants of Southern secession” 
2017/17, Gancia, G.; Ponzetto, G.A.M.; Ventura, J.: “Globalization and political structure” 
2017/18, González-Val, R.: “City size distribution and space” 
2017/19, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Pellegrino, G.: “What firms don’t know can hurt them: Overcoming 
a lack of information on technology” 
2017/20, Costa-Campi, M.T.; García-Quevedo, J.: “Why do manufacturing industries invest in energy R&D?” 






2018/1, Boadway, R.; Pestieau, P.: “The tenuous case for an annual wealth tax” 
2018/2, Garcia-López, M.À.: “All roads lead to Rome ... and to sprawl? Evidence from European cities” 
2018/3, Daniele, G.; Galletta, S.; Geys, B.: “Abandon ship? Party brands and politicians’ responses to a political 
scandal” 
2018/4, Cavalcanti, F.; Daniele, G.; Galletta, S.: “Popularity shocks and political selection” 
2018/5, Naval, J.; Silva, J. I.; Vázquez-Grenno, J.: “Employment effects of on-the-job human capital acquisition” 
2018/6, Agrawal, D. R.; Foremny, D.: “Relocation of the rich: migration in response to top tax rate changes from 
spanish reforms” 
2018/7, García-Quevedo, J.; Kesidou, E.; Martínez-Ros, E.: “Inter-industry differences in organisational eco-
innovation: a panel data study” 
2018/8, Aastveit, K. A.; Anundsen, A. K.: “Asymmetric effects of monetary policy in regional housing markets” 
2018/9, Curci, F.; Masera, F.: “Flight from urban blight: lead poisoning, crime and suburbanization” 
2018/10, Grossi, L.; Nan, F.: “The influence of renewables on electricity price forecasting: a robust approach” 
2018/11, Fleckinger, P.; Glachant, M.; Tamokoué Kamga, P.-H.: “Energy performance certificates and 
investments in building energy efficiency: a theoretical analysis” 
2018/12, van den Bergh, J. C.J.M.; Angelsen, A.; Baranzini, A.; Botzen, W.J. W.; Carattini, S.; Drews, S.; 
Dunlop, T.; Galbraith, E.; Gsottbauer, E.; Howarth, R. B.; Padilla, E.; Roca, J.; Schmidt, R.: “Parallel tracks 
towards a global treaty on carbon pricing” 
2018/13, Ayllón, S.; Nollenberger, N.: “The unequal opportunity for skills acquisition during the Great Recession in 
Europe” 
2018/14, Firmino, J.: “Class composition effects and school welfare: evidence from Portugal using panel data” 
2018/15, Durán-Cabré, J. M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Mas-Montserrat, M.; Salvadori, L.: “La brecha fiscal: estudio 
y aplicación a los impuestos sobre la riqueza” 
2018/16, Montolio, D.; Tur-Prats, A.: “Long-lasting social capital and its impact on economic development: the 
legacy of the commons” 
2018/17, Garcia-López, M. À.; Moreno-Monroy, A. I.: “Income segregation in monocentric and polycentric cities: 
does urban form really matter?” 
2018/18, Di Cosmo, V.; Trujillo-Baute, E.: “From forward to spot prices: producers, retailers and loss averse 
consumers in electricity markets” 
2018/19, Brachowicz Quintanilla, N.; Vall Castelló, J.: “Is changing the minimum legal drinking age an effective 
policy tool?” 
2018/20, Nerea Gómez-Fernández, Mauro Mediavilla: “Do information and communication technologies (ICT) 
improve educational outcomes? Evidence for Spain in PISA 2015” 
2018/21, Montolio, D.; Taberner, P. A.: “Gender differences under test pressure and their impact on academic 
performance: a quasi-experimental design” 




IEB Working Papers  
2018/23, Ramos, R.; Sanromá, E.; Simón, H.: “Wage differentials by bargaining regime in Spain (2002-2014). An 





2019/1, Mediavilla, M.; Mancebón, M. J.; Gómez-Sancho, J. M.; Pires Jiménez, L.: “Bilingual education and 
school choice: a case study of public secondary schools in the Spanish region of Madrid” 
2019/2, Brutti, Z.; Montolio, D.: “Preventing criminal minds: early education access and adult offending behavior” 
2019/3, Montalvo, J. G.; Piolatto, A.; Raya, J.: “Transaction-tax evasion in the housing market” 
2019/4, Durán-Cabré, J.M.; Esteller-Moré, A.; Mas-Montserrat, M.: “Behavioural responses to the 
re)introduction of wealth taxes. Evidence from Spain” 
2019/5, Garcia-López, M.A.; Jofre-Monseny, J.; Martínez Mazza, R.; Segú, M.: “Do short-term rental platforms 
affect housing markets? Evidence from Airbnb in Barcelona” 
2019/6, Domínguez, M.; Montolio, D.: “Bolstering community ties as a means of reducing crime” 
2019/7, García-Quevedo, J.; Massa-Camps, X.: “Why firms invest (or not) in energy efficiency? A review of the 
econometric evidence” 
2019/8, Gómez-Fernández, N.; Mediavilla, M.: “What are the factors that influence the use of ICT in the classroom 
by teachers? Evidence from a census survey in Madrid” 
2019/9, Arribas-Bel, D.; Garcia-López, M.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “The long-run redistributive power of the 
net wealth tax” 
2019/10, Arribas-Bel, D.; Garcia-López, M.A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Building(s and) cities: delineating urban 
areas with a machine learning algorithm” 






2020/01, Daniele, G.; Piolatto, A.; Sas, W.: “Does the winner take it all? Redistributive policies and political 
extremism” 
2020/02, Sanz, C.; Solé-Ollé, A.; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: “Betrayed by the elites: how corruption amplifies the 
political effects of recessions” 
2020/03, Farré, L.; Jofre-Monseny; J., Torrecillas, J.: “Commuting time and the gender gap in labor market 
participation” 
2020/04, Romarri, A.: “Does the internet change attitudes towards immigrants? Evidence from Spain” 
2020/05, Magontier, P.: “Does media coverage affect governments’preparation for natural disasters?” 
2020/06, McDougal, T.L.; Montolio, D.; Brauer, J.: “Modeling the U.S. firearms market: the effects of civilian 
stocks, crime, legislation, and armed conflict” 
2020/07, Veneri, P.; Comandon, A.; Garcia-López, M.A.; Daams, M.N.: “What do divided cities have in 
common? An international comparison of income segregation” 
2020/08, Piolatto, A.: “'Information doesn't want to be free': informational shocks with anonymous online platforms” 
2020/09, Marie, O.; Vall Castello, J.: “If sick-leave becomes more costly, will I go back to work? Could it be too 
soon?” 
2020/10, Montolio, D.; Oliveira, C.: “Law incentives for juvenile recruiting by drug trafficking gangs: empirical 
evidence from Rio de Janeiro” 
2020/11, Garcia-López, M.A.; Pasidis, I.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Congestion in highways when tolls and 
railroads matter: evidence from European cities” 
2020/12, Ferraresi, M.; Mazzanti, M.; Mazzarano, M.; Rizzo, L.; Secomandi, R.: “Political cycles and yardstick 
competition in the recycling of waste. evidence from Italian provinces” 
2020/13, Beigelman, M.; Vall Castelló, J.: “COVID-19 and help-seeking behavior for intimate partner violence 
victims” 
2020/14, Martínez-Mazza, R.: “Mom, Dad: I’m staying” initial labor market conditions, housing markets, and 
welfare” 
2020/15, Agrawal, D.; Foremny, D.; Martínez-Toledano, C.: “Paraísos fiscales, wealth taxation, and mobility” 
Public Policies ieb@ub.edu 
www.ieb.edu 
